Category: European Union Page 1 of 7

HOW SHOULD EUROPE RELATE TO CHINA, ON TRADE AND SECURITY

On May 28, 2023

The tension between trade policy, and military security policy, are coming to the fore in relations between The EU and China.

In the past, the United States tended to take the lead in deciding the West’s security relationship with China. This was because the US has substantial security interests and alliances in the western Pacific. President Nixon gave positive leadership when he visited China.

Meanwhile EU countries have been pursuing a vigorous and profitable policy of promoting trade with China. Germany led the way in this respect, especially through the export of German motor cars. This particular trend is weakening at the moment, although trade generally with China has recovered well.

There is a new problem. This is an openly declared and increasingly explicit US policy of curbing the growth and sophistication of the Chinese economy. This is being done because the US fears that China could pose a security threat to the US, and its allies (including Taiwan).

For example, the US wants to deny China access to certain types of semi conductor.

Security concerns were cited by the Trump Administration when it imposed hefty tariffs on Chinese steel and aluminium. China responded with tariffs of its own.

The US is also pressurizing its allies to join in some of these measures. The goal is to prevent China developing strongly in areas that might make a key contribution to its national security.

The WTO, of which China is a member, aims to ensure that global trade is governed by predictable and transparent rules. But “national security” is a matter of subjective judgement, to which such rules cannot easily be applied.

Furthermore China does not want WTO rules to apply to state owned enterprises, while the US is undermining the appeals mechanism on WTO rulings. The law of the jungle in international trade suits big counties, but not smaller ones. Ireland is fortunate to be part of an EU bloc that will defend its interests.

Recently, the US published its National Security Strategy.

It accused China of “wanting to reshape the international order” and of “assertive behaviour”…..hardly a hanging offence.

It said that it wanted the US to “outcompete” China.

It added that it would oppose any unilateral change in relations across the Taiwan Strait.

It said that the US does not support Taiwan independence and remains committed to a “one China” policy.

This language is quite conciliatory and makes one wonder what the then Speaker Nancy Pelosi was trying to achieve with her recent high profile visit to Taiwan.

At a time when we may need China to talk sense to the Russians and get them to back out of their unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

China had a strong record of defending the territorial integrity of states, notably against European powers in the nineteenth century. So it should not be neutral about the imperialist behaviour of Russia!

EUROPEAN UNION/AFRICAN UNION SUMMIT

By John Bruton

On February 20, 2022

In Africa, European Union

European leaders are discussing two topics this week……Ukraine and Africa.

The current situation in and around Ukraine may represent the biggest short term threat to the peace and prosperity of Europe.

But the biggest opportunity for Europe is to our south, in Africa.

The population of Africa is set to double by 2050. Working together Europeans and Africans complement one another.

The past behaviour of Europeans in the colonial era has left a legacy that has not yet been fully acknowledged and overcome.

But the focus should be on the opportunities.

A report by the European Council on Foreign Relations highlights some of these opportunities.

Gateway-to-growth-How-the-European-Green-Deal-can-strengthen-Africas-and-Europes-economies Download

THE PEACE OF EUROPE IS AT RISK

By John Bruton

On December 23, 2021

In European Union, Ukraine

I have visited Ukraine twice, once to observe their recent Presidential Elections, which were free and fair. It is troubling to see Russia massing its troops on Ukraine’s border.

But is is wise to fight a war over Ukraine’s “right” to join NATO? And even if one has a “right” to do something , is it necessarily right to do it!

Professor Gerard Toal of Virginia Tech has published a very sensible article in the Irish Times today. I shows how all sides are blind to the worries of others and acting as if everybody else is obliged to see them as they see themselves…..the most common mistake in politics.

Below is the text of Professor Toal’s excellent article.

Delusion on all sides has paved way for Russia-Nato standoff

“It is hard to be objective about the Ukraine crisis. Russia is massing tanks and troops next to Ukraine. US intelligence reports Russia is planning a multi-front invasion involving 175,000 troops in the early new year.

Accompanying Russia’s posture of war is fevered rhetoric about Ukraine as an aggressor state. Russia decries Nato infrastructure, weapons, training and military exercises in Ukraine.

Late last week, Russia released a proposed draft treaty of what it sees as a desirable new security order for Europe. Viewing it as a gun-point demand for a Russian sphere of influence, Western and Ukrainian officials immediately rejected the proposals.

Russia is behaving like a bully toward Ukraine. But why? What happened to the dream of Europe whole, free and at peace at the end of the Cold War? How did we get from that hopeful new dawn to the sobering prospect of military invasion in 21st-century Europe? The short answer is this: security delusions on all sides paved the way, delusions that are now on a dangerous collision course.

Russia’s security delusions are easiest to grasp. Thinking military force can create genuine security and influence in neighbouring states is delusional. Recovering under Russian president Vladimir Putin after a decade of crisis, Russia began rebuilding its power capacities across post-Soviet space.

In August 2008, the Russian army invaded Georgia after a reckless move by its pro-Nato leader Mikheil Saakashvili to crush Russian backed separatists. In March 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine as violent protests overthrew Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Kremlin leader. Russian forces annexed Crimea, but proxy forces backed by Russia failed to create a large secessionist territory (Novorossiya) in southeast Ukraine. Only in part of the Donbas did Russian backed separatists succeed.

The subsequent Minsk Accords were designed to ensure that Russia’s proxies would influence the geopolitical orientation of Ukraine. It has not worked out that way. Indeed, in all instances, Russia’s military actions polarised states it hoped to influence, driving them to deepen ties with Nato. What aggrieves Moscow today about the creeping Nato-isation of Ukraine is partly of its own making.

The security delusions of the Nato West are more difficult to recognise. After the Cold War, the alliance decided to expand not disband. Nato’s “open door” policy allowed former Soviet republics like the Baltic States to join the alliance. Veteran Soviet security officials, like the conspiratorial-minded Putin, were forced to accept that their Cold War enemy was now at the border. Nato, of course, did not see it this way. It argued that all states have a sovereign right to choose their own defence orientation. Further, they claimed, Nato is not a threat to any power. Rather, it is a civilisational alliance advancing security and freedom.

Critics, most prominently an aging American diplomat George Kennan, saw Nato expansion as a fateful error and predicted it would strengthen the hand of hardliners within Russia. He was right. The insecurity that Nato expansion was designed to address only redoubled insecurity as Russia rebuilt its power and reacted.

A self-fulfilling security dilemma took hold. Nato expansion was justified by the very insecurity it produced. By 2008, Russia publicly asserted that Nato membership for Georgia and Ukraine were its defensive red lines. Nato radicalised matters when in April 2008 it declared, in defiance of Russia, that those two countries would one day become members of the alliance.

Claiming Nato is not a threat to anyone is a delusion. Nato does not get to define Russia’s security perception. Presuming that expanding a military alliance to the border of an insecure great power advances security is delusional. Unilaterally exiting arms control agreements with Russia – like the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty the US left in August 2019 – is reckless behaviour.

Admitting Ukraine into the Nato procurement system, training its troops, building Nato-standard infrastructure, and supplying advanced weapons to its forces without grasping that this may inflame Russian insecurity is also delusional thinking. It is living solely within one’s benevolent view of oneself.

The tragedy of the current Ukraine crisis is how both Russia and Nato seemed trapped within self-defeating policies. In seeking greater territorial security Russia has pursued a policy of undermining the territorial integrity of neighbouring states. Its imperialistic habits and attitudes endure.

In the past it has used separatists to advance its geopolitical goals. It now appears poised to pursue a more radical policy of direct military intervention to change facts on the ground. This can only further inflame Ukrainian sentiment against it. In no region will the Russian army be welcomed. Many Ukrainians may not actively resist but some undoubtedly will wage an insurgency against Russian occupation if it comes to that.

The West appears trapped by its fixation on the principle that all states have the sovereign right to choose their own military orientation. They cite articles from past security agreements. But they ignore other articles asserting that security is indivisible. Security requires responsibility and that begins with acknowledging collective sources of insecurity. The coronavirus pandemic has made clear the importance of qualifying individual free choice: we all have responsibilities to the collective good.

Many in the West are also fixated with Munich and appeasement, Yalta and spheres of influence. This desire for historically selective moralised analogies betrays a desire to purify the present into simpleminded categories of good and evil. More disturbingly, it also propels desire for righteous action. Violence is soon easily justified.

While the overall picture looks grim, let us hope that this crisis is a spur to serious negotiations and, out of these, a good enough compromise. Ukraine is a desperately poor country whose people have been victimized by embedded corruption and oligopoly since the Soviet collapse. They deserve better that to be a sandbox for a proxy war between Russia and the West. As we extend them solidarity and support in this hour of anxiety, let us also acknowledge the prevailing security delusions that got us here.“

WHY IS THE ROW ABOUT THE PROTOCOL SO HARD TO RESOLVE?

By John Bruton

On June 18, 2021

In European Union, Ireland, UK

Leaders all over the European Union may be scratching their heads wondering about the motives for Boris Johnson’s behaviour over a Protocol on Ireland, that he was happy with only six months ago.

He is now saying he will

“do whatever it takes to protect the territorial integrity of the UK”

from the Protocol. This is notwithstanding the fact that, in Article 1 of the Protocol, which he agreed in 2019, Boris Johnson himself accepted that

“The Protocol respects the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom”.

He is claiming, variously, that he did not understand the meaning of what he signed, or that he was coerced by time pressure into it.

Every one of the EU laws, which under the Protocol will continue to apply in Northern Ireland, including the EU Customs Code of 2013,were made when the UK was a voting member of the EU.

So there is no basis for claiming the UK did not understand what these laws meant. They were involved in making them! You will search for a long time in the British press for an acknowledgement of that.

What of the argument that the UK was under time pressure when it agreed the Protocol?

The problem was that a UK government, of which Boris Johnson was a member, triggered the Article 50 process before it had settled in its own mind the sort of Brexit it wanted.

The EU would have been willing to extend the two year period, but Boris Johnson rejected that. So if the UK put itself under pressure, the problem was of its own making.

In fact, I believe the UK knew fully what it was doing at every stage, and was guided by short term domestic political considerations, and deliberately ignored everything else. This was its motivation, both when it signed up to the Protocol initially, and when it attempted to renege on it, a year or so later.

Boris Johnson’s motives were to keep the Conservative Party in power, and to keep Scotland in the Union .

He agreed to the Protocol, in the first case, because he wanted to “get Brexit done” and to use that achievement as his platform in the December 2019 General Election. The detail did not matter. This tactic worked magnificently for him, as we know.

CONFRONTATION WITH EU PAYS DIVIDENDS FOR BRITISH P.M

Keeping up a confrontation with the EU continues to work for him up to the present time. It has helped him make gains in this year’s local and by elections. As long as UK relations with the EU are hostile, there will a big vote bonus for the Conservatives in Leave supporting regions.

Confrontation with the EU also helps with keeping Scotland in the Union.

The row about the Protocol allows the EU to be portrayed as petty, bureaucratic, and obsessed with detail. Of course, this is precisely the detail that enables 27 different countries to have one set of rules. Doing business in Europe would be much more bureaucratic, if each of the 27 countries had its own separate set of rules, on all the any matters listed in the Protocol.

The more onerous EU border controls are made to appear, the more are Scots made to fear the costs for Scotland of a customs border between it and England, something that would follow from Scottish membership of a Customs Union with EU.

So the stance of Boris Johnson on the Protocol is power politics in a raw form, and it is unlikely to change in the near term.

EU RESPONSE……A COURT CASE BETTER THAN AN ECONOMIC WAR

What happens now?

The EU has already initiated legal proceedings against the UK. Unless the UK speedily agrees to implement the Protocol, this legal action will be intensified.

There is a worry that the case might drag on for a long time. But a long court case, which eventually yielded the right result, would be better than an Economic War.

How might the case develop?

The Withdrawal Treaty says that disputes may be referred to an Arbitration Panel of three independent persons. This Panel must announce its decision within 12 months of its appointment.

The legal issues are fairly simple, so the decision might be quick.

There are provisions for a fine to be imposed on any party in breach of its obligations.

It could be up to two years before a fine could actually be imposed. Boris Johnson might even want to drag the whole thing out until after a UK General Election. He might even like to get a second referendum on Scottish independence over with, while the case is still undecided.

USE OF ARTICLE 16 KICKS CAN DOWN THE ROAD

Another possibility is that the UK might trigger article 16 of the Protocol. Article 16 allows for safeguard measures where there are

“serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties , that are likely to persist”

But such measures, and any EU counter measures, would have to be restricted in their scope and duration according to Article 16. Article 16 does not provide for amendments to the Protocol. So using Article 16 would only kick the can down the road. It would solve nothing.

Vice President Sefcovic of the European Commission has raised the possibility of trade sanctions against the UK for breach of the Protocol.

Such sanctions would be designed to persuade the UK to come back into compliance with its Treaty obligations. The EU could impose tariffs or quotas on sectors of the UK economy which depend particularly on EU markets for exports

Of course, the UK might then retaliate with tariffs and quotas of its own. While these UK sanctions could hit Irish agricultural exports, they would also disrupt the economy of Northern Ireland. On balance, I think UK would seek other targets. But, in the end, everyone would lose…..a lot.

The best immediate option for the EU is to concentrate on its court case.

I am confident the Panel would find that the UK is obliged to implement the Protocol as it signed it . It would find that the plain words in the Protocol means what they say.

A finding from an independent Panel would be more influential, with British and Northern Irish public opinion, than any number of statements from EU leaders.

This is why I believe the court case is the best course to follow.

Let us not go back to the trade politics of the 1930’s!

BUT EXISTENTIAL ISSUES ARE AT STAKE

That said, if the court case does not lead to action by the UK to implement the agreed Protocol, either in its present form or as amended by agreement, a trade war between the EU and the UK will eventually take place, with sanctions and counter sanctions. This is inevitable because the EU can only continue to exist if Treaties are respected and acted upon. The EU itself is a Treaty based organisation. So this is literally an existential question for the EU. Without respect for Treaties, there is no EU.

Some historians believe it to be a fixed goal of British policy to maintain division and a balance of power in continental Europe. The very existence of a European Union is, in this analysis, a threat to British security. Some Brexiteers are not satisfied with taking the UK out of the EU. They will not say so publicly, but they would like the EU to break up. This is well understood in Paris and Berlin.

So the argument about the Protocol is about much more than Northern Ireland. It is about the future of Europe, and this is not a struggle in which Ireland will remain on the sidelines.

THE PRESIDENT’S TAKE ON THE EUROPEAN UNION

By John Bruton

On May 26, 2021

In Books, European Union, Michael D. Higgins

The President of Ireland, Michael D Higgins has recently published a collection of his speeches entitled “Reclaiming the European Street, Speeches on Europe and the European Union 2016-20” . The publisher is the Lilliput Press

Drawing on a lifetime of reading in sociology, philosophy and history, President Higgins makes his case for European unity and for Ireland’s participation in it.

As might be expected of a man of the Left, he is critical of capitalism, and sees state or collective action, whether at national or EU level, as capable of playing a bigger role in helping the people of Europe to flourish and achieve their potential.

For similar reasons he is against what he calls “austerity”, but does not address what is to be done if the interest rate at which a state can borrow becomes unaffordable, which is where Ireland found itself in 2010.

No politician chooses austerity for its own sake! But sometimes it is necessary to preserve a country’s freedom of action.

AN INTELLECTUAL JOURNEY

Michael D Higgins was not always enthusiastic about European integration.

In their introduction to this collection of speeches, his editors, Joachim Fischer and Fergal Lenehan , point out that he campaigned against the Single European Act of 1987, and also campaigned against the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.

These two Treaties provided the legal basis for the EU’s biggest achievements, namely the creation of Single Market, and the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union and the Euro. They also enhanced the role of the democratically elected European Parliament.

It would have been interesting if the editors of this collection could have elaborated upon President Higgins’ intellectual journey on European integration, from the sceptical positions he adopted in 1987 and 1992, to the more favourable ones he adopts today. President Higgins journey is one many left leaning politicians have followed and it would have been interesting to tease this out.

In an attempt to understand the evolution of his thinking, I reread some of the speeches he made in the Senate and Dail in the 1980’s on moves to closer EU integration.

One major concern he had then was the effect of the new EU Treaties on Irish neutrality. He opposed confining Irish neutrality merely to military matters. He believed Ireland should be politically as well as militarily neutral. Such a position is not sustainable nowadays. The EU is now adopting common positions on geopolitical issues, on a daily basis. As an EU member, Ireland is not politically neutral. States are now so interdependent, that complete political neutrality is almost impossible. The recent cyber attack shows how we need common defences that work.

Michael D Higgins was also sceptical about the EU Single Market, and feared it would lead to job losses. These fears have not been realised. The contrary proved to be the case. Employment here is much higher than it as in 1992 when the Single Market was inaugurated.

ALTIERO SPINELLI

A clue to the influences that led Michael D Higgins, over the past 20 years, to a more favourable view of European integration may be found in the careers of the people he quotes in the speeches in this book.

The most frequently cited is Altiero Spinelli, author of the European Parliament’s 1984 Spinelli Report, which was the precursor of the Single European Act of 1987.

Spinelli had been a member of the Communist resistance to Italian Fascism and was imprisoned on the island of Ventotene. There he co wrote the Ventotene Manifesto.

This Manifesto is mentioned dozens of times in this book.

Learning from the lesson of the World War, then in progress, the Ventotene Manifesto called in 1941 for a wholly new Europe. It sought

“the definitive abolition of the division of Europe into national sovereign states”

because it was

“impossible to maintain a balance of power between European states”.

It argued for a revolution, with a goal of the emancipation of the working classes. But, interestingly, it added that

“the working classes must not be left at the mercy of the economic power of monopolistic trade unions”.

This may have been a reference to the corporatist trade unions set up under Fascism, but it could be seen as a general argument against the closed shop.

After the War, Spinelli pursued the goal of European Unity, and supported the unsuccessful attempt to set up a European Defence community in 1954.

From 1970 to 1976, he was a member of the European Commission, and came to Dublin in 1972 when Ireland was debating whether to join the then European Common Market. On that occasion he met Michael D Higgins, and sought to persuade the Irish Labour Party that support for European Unity should not be left to “conservative” parties.

Spinelli did not achieve his goal at first attempt, as Labour opposed Ireland joining the Common Market at that time. But Spinelli left a lasting impression on Michael D Higgins, which is evidenced by the contents of Michael D Higgins speeches over 40 years later.

WHAT ECONOMIC ROLE FOR THE STATE?

Another Italian intellectual influence, acknowledged by the author, is the economist Mariana Mazzucato.

She argues for an “Entrepreneurial State”, claiming that many important technological advances originate in decisions by the public sector, and that economic development cannot be left to the private sector. I agree with this. Indeed free markets themselves can only exist if a state in there to make and enforce rules.

But when the state itself gets involved directly in managing businesses, it can be slow to adapt to new realities, because of political pressures, including from monopolistic trade unions, of the kind identified in the Ventotene Manifesto.

Looking to the future, President Higgins says

“EU Institutions must be adequate and sufficient to enable the restoration and protection of social cohesion”.

This asks too much of the EU.

The EU is only allowed to spend 1% of EU GDP, and there is no sign that limit will be raised soon. So restoring social cohesion must primarily be the responsibility of member states, which spend 40% of GDP or more, and have the power to levy taxes, in a way that the EU cannot do.

It is interesting to note that, on the eve of the pandemic, the Economic and Social Research Institute found that income inequality in Ireland was at its lowest level for many years, and 16% below the level it was in 1987. It is notable that this report got little or no coverage in the Irish media.

GREEN AUSTERITY.

The President is right when he condemns the

“uncritical pursuit of ever accelerating growth without consideration of the consequences”.

That must change if we are to meet the challenge of climate change.

Lower economic growth will mean less tax revenue and less money to spend. Green living will mean more austere living, and a more limited range of choices.

It is to be hoped that we will take responsibility for this ourselves as a people, and avoid blaming it on external agencies like the EU.

The issues raised in this book are important, and they reflect a serious and engaged mind.

THE ARTICLE 16 ROW IS LIABLE TO HAPPEN AGAIN UNLESS LESSONS ARE LEARNED

By John Bruton

On February 10, 2021

In BREXIT, European Union, Northern Ireland

What lessons are to be learned from the unfortunate controversy around the European Commission’s brief consideration of using Article 16 of the Northern Ireland Protocol to stop exports from the EU of some Covid 19 vaccines to Britain, via Northern Ireland?

The UK Minister, Michael Gove said “it was a moment when trust was eroded and damage done” and the chairman of the UK’s House of Commons EU committee described it as a “vindictive act”.

On the other hand, the EU has a sovereign right to impose export restrictions, and also to protect its market from imports of goods that do not comply with EU standards (whether these come into Ireland or to any other part of the EU)

Lessons must be learned, because this sort of Article 16 problem could recur over and over again for years to come, as the UK diverges more and more from the EU.

The first thing to say is that the proposed EU restrictions on exports of certain vaccines are still going ahead.

All that has changed is that Article 16 of the Protocol is not now being used to enforce these restrictions. The restrictions will presumably be enforced in, and by, the pharmaceutical manufacturing plants themselves, inside the EU rather than on the border.

Secondly, the restrictions only apply to vaccines that were subject to an Advanced Purchase Agreement with the European Commission, where the European taxpayer had put up money to help the pharmaceutical manufacturers to develop and test the vaccines. This was agreed on the basis that the EU would then get supplies of the vaccines under an agreed schedule from the manufacturer.

This is not unreasonable in itself.

It is open to question whether the present elaborate process of export restriction and authorisation was really necessary to ensure the EU got the supplies. A threat of civil legal action for breach of contract would seem to be a more targeted approach, than the highly bureaucratic export ban we now have.

Of course, it is theoretically possible that Northern Ireland could have been used as a backdoor to circumvent the EU restriction of exports to the rest of the UK. To avoid this, the regulation, now in force, still requires information to be provided on vaccines going to Northern Ireland.

SHOULD ARTICLE 16 HAVE BEEN USED?

But it is quite clear that Article 16 was not the right tool to use to achieve the goal the Commission had set for itself.

We should look at what Article 16 of the Protocol allows.

It provides for unilateral safeguard measures to be adopted by either the EU or the UK, where there are difficulties that “are liable to persist”.

Under Article 16 the safeguard measures should only be ones that are “strictly necessary to remedy the situation”.

Arguably neither condition was met in this case.

The vaccine supply difficulties are inherently temporary. They are not likely to persist.

Other measures could have been or be adopted, within the EU itself, to require the vaccine manufacturers to meet their obligations, without using Article 16 of the Protocol. So the use of Article 16 was not “strictly necessary.” It should be a last resort, not a first resort.

DID THE COMMMISSION MAKE ITS DECISIONS IN THE BEST WAY?

So why did then use of Article 16 come to be considered by the Commission at all?

There was a degree on panic in many countries, notably Germany and France, about the pace of supply of vaccines.

The Commission was coming under pressure.

Even though it was the manufacturers that were failing to fulfil their contracts, it was the Commission that had negotiated those contracts. The fact that negotiating this sort of contract was something new for the Commission was not an acceptable excuse, nor was it enough to say that the delays might have been much greater, and the price to the taxpayer much higher, if each the 27 EU countries had been left to negotiate their own contracts, and outbid one another. But the Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen felt she had to show she was “doing something”.

She decided on the speedy introduction of selective export restrictions.

In the interests of speed, she adopted a decision making procedure, that maximised the possibility of mistakes. Rather than call a meeting of the full Commission, which could have been done by secure video, she decided to push the ban through using a written procedure, leaving minimal time for scrutiny.

Adopting such a radical measure, like an export restriction by this short cut written procedure was inherently problematic. While the EU has a sovereign right to restrict exports outside its borders, it is an inherently serious step, and should never again be attempted in this way.

Article 17 (8) of the Treaty makes clear that the Commission, as a body, is responsible for its acts, and the Commission’s own rules of Procedure state clearly that “ the Commission shall act collectively”.

The last minute use of the written procedure to make an important international decision minimised the possibility of genuinely collective decision making by Commissioners. That is why it should not happen again. It weakens the authority of Commission, and thus of the EU as a whole.

THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROTOCOL IS A FRAGILE COMPROMISE

The other lesson to take from what happened is that it exposed the inherently fragile nature of compromise that is the Northern Ireland Protocol.

The Protocol requires the UK to implement and enforce EU law in respect of goods standards within part of the UK, and to prevent goods entering that part of the UK, if they do not comply with these standards. That is no small thing on principle.

It may not be so difficult to implement it now, when the UK has only just left the EU, and UK and EU goods standards are almost identical. But, gradually, as the UK begins to adopt different standards for goods to those applicable in the EU, the risks of future controversies will increase.

Every time either the UK or the EU adopts a standard for goods that is different from the one the other is applying, there will be an additional barrier or restriction between Britain and Northern Ireland. Because the issues are highly technical, the flare up could be sudden and unexpected, with the risk of wholly unintended consequences, as the latest controversy shows.

One should add that there is also the possibility of disputes on the interpretation of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the UK and the EU.

Under Article 9.4 of the TCA, either side may adopt “rebalancing measures”, where there is a significant divergence from the Level Playing Field provisions of the TCA, if they feel they have been put at a disadvantage by the divergence.

To the extent, if any, that these “rebalancing measures” affect Northern Ireland, there will be an additional issue to be solved.

So one must hope that it never comes to this, and that the UK and the EU work in harmony in future, because the more disharmony there is, the greater will be the political problems for both parts of Ireland.

This will require a lot of tedious work by diplomats and officials in Brussels, London, Dublin and Belfast to operate an early warning system to avoid conflicts like the recent one. This is a permanent, but inevitable, extra burden of Brexit.

THE EU AND THE NEW BIDEN ADMINISTRATION

By John Bruton

On January 24, 2021

In European Union

The newly sworn-in US President Joe Biden has pledged to and I quote repair our alliances and engage with the world once again, so what will EU-US relations look like under a Biden presidency. The EU will certainly be looking to nurture its friendship with their Washington Post Brexit, closer to home, diplomatic relations have been somewhat strained over recent hours after an indication from the UK, although perhaps we’re hearing that that’s been reversed now to deny the EU Ambassador in London full diplomatic status of that. I think Boris Johnson is set just in the last few minutes that that will not be the case that there will be full diplomatic status given to the EU ambassador to the United Kingdom. For more on all this. Let’s talk to former Taoiseach and EU ambassador to the United States John Bruton a very good afternoon to John Bruton. Thanks for taking our call that news just coming to hand from my I think Boris Johnson in the last few minutes in relation to the question of the status of the the UK the EU Ambassador and UK. I thought it’s important that …
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EACCNY Pulse: Transatlantic Business Insights

By John Bruton

On January 14, 2021

In BREXIT, European Union, Northern Ireland, Podcast, Trade Agreement, UK

Listen to this final “Brexit Musing” episode with John Bruton, the former Irish Prime Minister (Taoiseach) and former EU Ambassador to the United States who will share his wisdom on what Brexit means and his thoughts moving forward with regard to not only the UK and EU, but also the U.S.

WHAT THE BREXIT TRADE DEAL MEANS

By John Bruton

On December 29, 2020

In BREXIT, European Union, Trade Agreement, UK

The Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and the UK is an exercise in damage limitation. The UK will face numerous obstacles because of its decision to leave the EU, including leaving the Customs Union and Single Market.

But it was in nobody’s interest to add to these obstacles. That was the spirit in which the EU approached the negotiation.

The Agreement may run to 1256 pages, but it boils down to some fairly simple and sensible ideas.

While no longer a member of the EU, the UK still wants to do business with the EU, and the EU members want to do business with it.

So, for the future, there needs to be a system for ensuring that there are no surprises, or unfair trading , that would disrupt mutually beneficial business. That is essentially what the Agreement is all about.

While the UK was a member of the EU, that goal was achieved by having a common set of business rules, made democratically and together, and interpreted in a consistent way by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). These rules could be enforced in national courts. In other words the goal of predictable and fair business conditions between the UK and its fellow EU members was achieved directly by common action.

Under the new Agreement, the same goal will be pursued, but indirectly.

Common rules, made and interpreted in common, will be replaced, as far as trade between the EU and the UK is concerned, by understandings set out in the Agreement, which will be interpreted by arbitrators appointed under the Agreement.

These understandings will have legal force, but will generally only be enforceable under the procedures set out in the Agreement, rather than directly in national courts.

While the EU and the UK will each be free to determine their own policies on the environment, social and working conditions, and subsidy controls, Article 9.4 of the Agreement allows for “rebalancing” measures to be taken by the other side if it feels its own businesses are being put at a disadvantage. This is supposed to restore the level in the level playing field.

The Agreement contains principles, now to be enshrined in international law through the Agreement, that are shared by the EU and the UK. These cover environmental, social and subsidy issues. Arbitration Tribunals to be set up under the Agreement will interpret these agreed principles in specific cases. They will have a legal, but also a political, task.

Most of the text of the Agreement is taken up with procedures for resolving disputes.

Matters, currently resolved in national courts under EU law, will have to be resolved at inter state level between the UK and the EU, rather than in the national courts. This is inherently more cumbersome.

Sometimes the issue will be settled by political agreement in one of the myriad of committees set up under the Agreement.

ARBITRATION…. THE CORE IDEA

If the issue cannot be settled in this way, it will go the arbitration.

So, instead of the interpretation being done by Judges of the ECJ, they will be done by an Arbitration Tribunal set up under the Agreement.

An Arbitration Tribunal will consist of three people. There will be lists of qualified arbitrators from which the three may be chosen, one by the UK and one by the EU and the Chair of the Tribunal will be someone who is not from EU or the UK.

I think this idea that the chair must come from outside either the EU or UK may prove difficult. It will not always be easy to find suitable chairs who are not either British or EU citizens, especially as the work will have to be done at short notice and under tight time limits.

To qualify for appointment, an arbitrator will have to have “demonstrated expertise in law and international trade” . They will all have to be people “whose independence is beyond doubt”. They will serve in their individual capacities, and not take instructions from anyone. They will have to be people who would qualify to be judges in their home countries.

I suspect there will be a lot of intense haggling over the composition of particular Arbitration Tribunals. The nationality of the arbitrators and their past records will be scrutinised by the governments most affected by the issues in dispute.

There are detailed provisions in the Agreement to prevent stalling by either the EU, or the UK, in appointing Arbitrators. Once established, the Tribunals will have to deliver their ruling within 130 days . Within 30 days after that, the affected party will have to say how they will comply with the ruling.

This entire structure of dispute resolution will be presided over by a Partnership Council to be chaired jointly, by a UK Minister and an EU Commissioner. It will be assisted by over 20 specialised committees and a number of Working Groups, all of which are listed in Title III of the Agreement.

EVEN MORE MEETINGS THAN BEFORE!

I expect that there will, in the future, be even more EU related meetings for UK officials than in the past. But the dynamic will be different.

Instead of being able to build alliances on particular topics with other EU member states, the UK will in future find itself alone in the room with the European Commission.

The Commission side will have instructions, negotiated in advance with the 27 member states, so there will be a high degree of rigidity in the process.

As the EU member state most affected by relations between the UK and the EU, this will be a particular challenge for Ireland. Irish officials in Brussels and will have to stay on top of all that is going on in the various EU/UK committees. Cultivating an understanding with the Commission officials serving on these committees will be a priority.

No longer in the EU, the UK will, notwithstanding the provisions of the Agreement, encounter significant extra bureaucracy and uncertainty in doing business with the EU.

PARTING COMPANY GRADUALLY

This will lead to a gradual divergence between the UK and all its European neighbours, including Ireland. That, in turn, will have cultural and political effects.

The UK, and the EU states including Ireland will, so to speak, be mixing in different company .They will increasingly be seeing the world from diverging angles of vision. Issues that were previously depoliticised will become more political.

Eventually, this may affect the way the UK sees its physical and military security. NATO is already under strain, and Brexit creates a new fault line within NATO.

While Ireland is not in NATO, we live in a part of the world which has sheltered under the NATO umbrella, and we are deeply interconnected with NATO’s biggest member, the US.

Brexit may be over and done with, but the forces which led to it…identity politics and suspicion of foreigners….have not gone away.

BRITAIN AND EUROPE IN A TROUBLED WORLD

By John Bruton

On October 30, 2020

In Books, European Union

Vernon Bogdanor, Professor of Government in Kings College in London, has recently written a book on a very topical subject, “Britain and Europe in a Troubled World”.

Its publication by Yale University Press coincides with the likely agreement on a new future relationship between the UK and the EU, which the UK recently left.

The first part of the book is historical.

It shows that the Attlee Labour government in London in the early 1950’s chose not to join the European Coal and Steel Community(ECSC) because it had recently nationalised the British coal and Steel industry and felt that the ECSC would have too much of a private sector focus. It did not want a continental body telling Durham miners that their coal were surplus to requirements, or too costly.

Churchill favoured a United States of Europe, but with Britain in partnership, and trading, with it, but without being a member itself.

He saw Britain as most comfortable as sitting in the overlap between three concentric circles –

Europe,
the transatlantic relationship with America, and
the Commonwealth ( or Empire as Churchill would have preferred to call it).

Churchill even went as far as envisaging

“ a sense of enlarged patriotism and common citizenship”

among Europeans. He was right in this, but the goal is not yet achieved.

Churchill’s successor as Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, wanted free trade with Europe, but no Customs Union and no political Union. He did not believe the six countries attempting to agree such a Union in 1957 would succeed in their goal.

But they did succeed.

Meanwhile the UK was losing its Empire, the links with the Commonwealth were weakening, and the Suez debacle of 1956 had reminded them that their alliance with the US was not based on equality.

So, in 1961, Macmillan changed his mind and made what he called the “grim choice”to join the Common Market, only to have the application vetoed by de Gaulle because he felt that Britain was too close the US, and was not wholehearted in its commitment to Europe.

Eventually another Conservative Prime Minister, Edward Heath did succeed in persuading France to allow the UK to join the European Communities in 1973. In the recent Brexit debate, many Brexiteers claimed that the UK only ever wanted to join a common market, without any political strings. But at the time Edward Heath told the House of Commons in April 1975 that the European Communities

“were founded for a political purpose, the political purpose was to absorb the new Germany into the structure of the European family”.

Vernon Bogdanor identifies a number of issues that led UK public opinion to turn away from the EU. notably

the rows about the UK’s financial contribution,
the ejection of the £ from the European Monetary System,
immigration, under the free movement provisions of the EU Treaties and
the upsurge in identity politics in the wake of the financial crash of 2008.

He has a final chapter in the book entitled “Never Closer Union” in which he attempts to say what will happen to the EU after Brexit.

It contains a number of contestable statements like

“ few in Europe had heard of Juncker” before he became President of the Commission,
Germany has “no desire for fiscal union”, and even that
there is a “very real possibility that the EU could disintegrate”.

Of course , nothing can be ruled out but the decision, after the UK had left, to allow the EU to borrow on its own account to boost the post Covid economic recovery suggest that the European Union is in much better health than the author believes.

Indeed his sentiments illustrate why Britain was never fully comfortable as a member of the European Union. It had joined with its head, but never with its heart or its imagination. In that sense Brexit was inevitable.